|
'the Bristol Channel was opened up to
unrestricted torpedo warfare by 12 January 1940'
Above: An extract from the map which
illustrates the gradual extension of the U-boat operational areas. |
The Initial Situation
The U-boats started the War with a strict adherence
to international law. Although the law was complicated, the ‘Prize Regulations’
were considered appropriate for U-boat operations. Merchant ships could only be sunk after
being stopped and searched and steps taken to ensure the safety of the crews. Once the
ships had been evacuated they could be sunk by torpedo or gunfire. It was obvious that
careful observance of these rules would be impractical, and even dangerous for the U-boats
so the following details were added to the order:
‘As long as war against merchant shipping is
governed by the Prize Regulations, attacks are to be aimed at ships which by the protocol
may be sunk without warning. These are:
troopships, i.e. vessels which are observed to be
carrying troops or war material, or which may be identified in other ways;
vessels escorted by enemy ships or aircraft;
vessels taking part in enemy actions or acting in
direct support of enemy operations, for example by passing intelligence. Participation in
operations is presumed if a merchant ship prepares to resist or takes any action
calculated to jeopardise the U-boat.
The observance of the Prize Regulations would only
be obligatory if the enemy ships were unarmed.’
The reason behind this somewhat restrained approach
was due to the diplomatic efforts being made to remove France from the alliance of powers
against Germany. The German government was making a considerable effort to avoid any
hostile action towards the French. These restrictions proved extremely difficult for the
U-boats to operate effectively, particularly when using torpedoes.Where possible, early
U-boat commanders would surface and use their deck gun thus giving themselves a chance to
check the situation before commencing hostile action.
Convoys were frequently escorted by a mixture of
British and French warships making a nonsense of the approach. The eventual solution was a
series of staged orders extending the scale of operations as political relations
deteriorated. Unrestricted U-boat warfare was gradually imposed by these orders. The
Bristol Channel was given a special mention, due in part to the increased use of the west
coast ports. U-boat command were aware that the Channel would be a focus of shipping
activity as convoys assembled for routing to North America. Consequently the Bristol
Channel was opened up to unrestricted torpedo warfare by 12 January 1940. The progressive
removal of restrictions is shown in the following orders:
(ZONE A)
‘... ‘... all ships in the North Sea between 51
and 56 north and 4 west and 0 may be attacked without warning. Endeavour is to be made to
remain unobserved during attacks in order that the enemy may suspect mines.
For political reasons an exemption was ordered on 11
January for bona fide American ships and friendly neutrals (Japanese,
Spanish, Italian and Russian) and on 2 February the Danish "Maltese Cross"
ships, which seem to have been forgotten, were added to the exemption.
Within a month three further announcements were made
-
(ZONE B) (ZONE B) Coloured yellow 12th January 1940
. . . . All ships excepting friendly neutrals,
in and to the west of the Bristol Channel may be attacked without warning."
(ZONE C) (ZONE C) 24 January 1940
. . . The area off the south-east coast from
Flamborough Head to Dover, and eastwards a little beyond the British danger area is
unrestricted."
(EXTENSION OF A and B) (EXTENSION OF A and B) 24 January 1940
"Area A is extended to 2 E., Area B
southwards and south-west to 10 30’ west and to include the whole of the Irish Sea.
Irish territorial waters extend for 10 miles."
(ZONE D) (ZONE D) 9th February, 1940
. . . . . . Area between zones A and C is now
unrestricted."
The outbreak of war with Holland and Belgium changed
the situation in the southern North Sea as follows:
10 May, 1940
. . . Area C is extended eastwards to the
Dutch coast at Texel, and southwards and westwards to include the whole of the
Channel."
To intensify action against Britain and France,
U-boats were permitted on 24 May to operate unrestrictedly in the area west of Scotland
(Zone E) and the area off the French Atlantic coast (Zone F).
This last measure completed the ring round Britain.
Within a strip of some 60 to 100 miles around Britain and off the French Atlantic coast
all ships, apart from the exceptions already given, were attacked without warning. Outside
this area operations against neutral ships were still conducted in accordance with the
Prize Regulations.
As there were only 18 U-boats available for
operations at the beginning of the War, there was considerable thought on how they should
be deployed. The initial response was to send boats out singly into inshore waters and
areas where merchantmen had to cross (i.e. the North Channel, St George’s Channel,
and the English Channel). U-boat command anticipated that the Royal Navy would quickly
adopt the convoy system which was expected to cause much disruption to normal trade
patterns. Moreover, the Prize Regulations would expose U-boats to unnecessary risk from
British anti-submarine measures, at a time when the British strength in this area was
still largely untested.
There were enough doubts about the military and
political situation in September 1939 to prompt U-boat command to adopt a cautionary
approach. The 18 boats were deployed mainly to the south-west of Ireland across the
traditional shipping routes from America and the Mediterranean. The entrance to the
Bristol Channel was guarded by U 28. Within days, U 28
had scored its first success, the sinking of the MV Vancouver City south of Waterford
Harbour. A number of the U-boats in this first disposition sank merchant ships that were
travelling without escort and in accordance with the Prize Regulations. U-boat command
expected ships to be gathered into the convoy system by October with the likely outcome
that U-boats were likely to come into contact with British anti-submarine forces very
quickly.
Admiral Dönitz knew that the Royal Navy was placing
considerable faith in its ASDIC system (a supersonic underwater reflected beam giving
range and bearing). Such was British faith in this technology that senior government
advisors even believed that it had largely negated the U-boat as an effective weapon!
Dönitz’s aggressive U-boat commanders were keen to meet this challenge as soon as
possible.
The U-boats move to the Atlantic takes the
story further |